



August 20, 2018

Via Electronic Submission:

Mr. Donald S. Clark
Secretary of the Commission
Federal Trade Commission
600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20580

**Re: Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century Hearings,
Project Number P181201 – Investment Community Request for HSR Reform**

Dear Secretary Clark,

The Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) respectfully submits the included bibliography in response to the request for general comments before the “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century Hearings, Project Number P181201.”

For over two hundred years, reliable and effective intellectual property rights have facilitated dynamic efficiency and growth in innovation markets in the U.S. economy. They have produced tremendous benefits for consumers via new products and services, as well as incentivized competition in the innovation industries. The Commission has not investigated these fundamental issues since at least 2011 and they deserve a rehearing, especially in light of the extensive empirical, theoretical, and historical research on these issues that have been produced in the ensuing years.

Thus, we write to provide the Commission with a record of data-driven, rigorous scholarship on the intersection of intellectual property law and competition law. The Commission hopefully will consider these resources as it examines the vital role of intellectual property in promoting dynamic efficiency, innovation markets, and consumer welfare.

Respectfully submitted,

Adam Mossoff

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